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  Abstract 
While using new data and standard growth-accounting techniques, this 
paper takes a closer look at the Swedish productivity revival in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. In particular, I find large total factor productivity 
growth in high-tech producing sectors and capital deepening associated 
with high-tech equipment elsewhere. In addition, for high-tech produc-
ers, high-tech capital deepening has as a rule contributed negatively to 
labor productivity growth – a result above all driven by large increases 
in hours worked in this sector. I also find that in the business sector, the 
contribution from high-tech capital deepening to labor productivity 
growth increased from about 1 percent 1994 to 9 percent 1999. 
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1  Introduction 
Throughout the 1990s the Swedish economy experienced a fairly strong resurgence in 
average labor productivity (ALP) growth (c.f. figures 1 and 2). After growing only 
about 1.2 percent per year from 1981 through 1990, labor productivity growth for the 
economy as a whole jumped to close to 2 percent per year over the period 1991-2000. 
Annual labor productivity growth for the total business sector averaged slightly more 
than 2.5 percent over the period 1991-2000 – about a 50 percent higher growth rate 
than its average annual rate over the period 1981-1990.
1 Annual labor productivity 
growth for the goods sector, in turn, averaged almost 4 percent over the period 1991-
2000 compared to 2.8 percent in 1981-1990. Productivity accelerated in the service 
sector as well – from an annual growth rate close to 1 percent during the 1980s to 
about 1.7 percent during the 1990s.
2 The manufacturing sector started to experience a 
particularly strong resurgence in labor productivity growth in the aftermath of the 
recession years 1990-1993 (the deepest recession since the 1930s). 
 
This revival in productivity during the 1990s – which is notable in comparison with 
the Swedish historical record dating back more than a decade – has been accompanied 
by a speeding up in the price decline of computer hardware and sizeable capital out-
lays on information and communication technology (ICT) equipment.
3 By the end of 
1999, for example, the current dollar stock of business sector ICT equipment ap-
proached 16 billion – in this sector, the share of  real ICT capital in total capital in-
                                                 
1 The business sector is in some studies defined exclusive of the agriculture, hunting, forestry, and 
fishing sectors. In this article, the business sector refers to the total business sector in the sense of mar-
ket producers and producers for own final use. Note also that one potential reason why the computed 
productivity growth rates can nonetheless diverge somewhat between studies, although they refer to 
identical sectors, is that labor input is sometimes measured by the number of employees rather than 
worked hours. Another reason is that growth rates are sometimes approximated by log-differences. In 
this article, labor input is always measured by hours worked and log-differences are used for all growth 
rates. 
2 This resurgence in Swedish productivity was parallel to the U.S. productivity revival in the 1990s – 
this period has now been identified as the longest-ever-recorded period of  high and sustained U.S. 




creased from 3.2 percent in 1993 to 5.2 percent in 1999 (see table 3 below). In the 
goods sector this share increased from 4.0 percent to 5.9 percent, while in the service 
sector it increased from 2.9 to 5.0 percent. Furthermore, the ICT capital share i n-
creased from 7.4 in 1993 to 10.1 percent in 1999 in the manufacturing sector, and, in-
terestingly, it decreased somewhat from 32.9 to 31.3 percent in a collective ICT sector 



















Figure 1. Average labor productivity growth 1981-2000. 
Note: Total refers to the whole economy. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3 ICT investments are defined throughout this article to include capital outlays on computer hard-
ware (product-ISIC code 30.02) and software (ISIC 72.2) as well as telecommunications equipment 
(ISIC 32.1, 32.2, 32.3). 
4 This sector is defined here (and in the following) to include the manufacturing of (i) office machin-
ery and computers (ISIC 30), (ii) cables and wires (ISIC 313), (iii) radio, television and communication 
equipment (ISIC 32), (iv) medical, surgical and orthopedic instruments (ISIC 331), (v) telecommunica-
tions equipment (measured by radio transmit), plus the operation of cable-television and the use of 
electric power (ISIC 642), and (vi) data processing and computer consulting (ISIC 72). The reason why 
(iv) is included in this collective measure is that substantial productivity improvements have in recent 
times been accomplished also in biology, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology in general – and 














Figure 2. Business sector growth in ALP and TFP. 
Note: Labor’s share is set to equal 0.7. Annual average growth of ALP (TFP) has increased from 1.85 
(1.26) percent 1980-1989 to 2.36 (1.58) percent 1990-99.  
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
Table 1 shows that the Swedish business sector has – as in most other developed 
countries – been shifting out of goods production into services over the last 30 years. 
For example, the goods’ share in output has declined from 40 percent in 1970 to 27 
percent in 2000, and the hours worked share has at the same time declined from 47 to 
29 percent. The flip side of this development is the parallel increase in the service sec-
tor’s share in output (from 32 percent to 45 percent) and in hours worked (from 35 to 
41 percent). Because the decline in the goods sector’s share in total hours is larger 
than that of total output (18 percentage points as compared with 13 percentage 
points), the relative output per hours worked hour has increased in the goods sector 
(i.e. this shift in the business sector has resulted in comparatively stronger labor pro-
ductivity in the goods sector). While this reorganization of the business sector has 
continued in the last couple of years, it has, at least to some extent, been camouflaged 
by the fast-growing high-tech sector in the 1990s and the recent collapse of the very 
same sector. Table 2 shows the shares in output and hours worked during the period 
1993-1999 (thus, the impact of the ICT collapse cannot be observed in these data). 
According to the table, the decline (increase) of the goods (services) sector has, as ex-





Table 1 Restructuring in the Swedish business sector 1970–2000 
Share of output (GDP) and hours worked (H) 
 
  1970  1980  1990  2000 
Sector  GDP  H  GDP  H  GDP  H  GDP  H 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                  Goods    40.2    47.0    33.5    38.2    31.0    32.3    26.6    28.8 
   Manufacturing    25.0    28.2    20.4    23.1    18.8    19.6    19.2    18.4 
   Construction    8.3    9.9    6.3    7.9    6.3    7.5    3.8    5.9 
   Other goods    6.9    9.0    6.9    7.2    6.0    5.2    3.6    4.4 
Services    32.2    34.5    35.3    33.8    39.1    36.6    44.7    41.4 
   Wholesale and Retail    9.9    15.4    9.7    14.7    9.4    13.7    9.7    13.6 
   Transp. and Comm.    7.2    1.5    8.4    1.8    8.3    2.0    8.7    2.1 
   Finance and Insurance    0.3    1.5    3.4    1.8    5.1    2.0    3.6    2.1 
   Business and Real est.    10.7    2.7    11.8    5.2    14.1    7.4    19.1    10.2 
   Other services    4.1    5.4    2.0    3.1    2.2    3.7    3.6    5.6 
Note: The output shares are computed from current SEK values. The sub-sectors are defined as fol-
lows: Goods (ISIC 01-45), Manufacturing (ISIC 10-37), Construction (ISIC 45), Services (ISIC 50-95), 
Wholesale and retail (ISIC 50-52), Transport and communication (ISIC 60-64), Finance and Insurance 
(ISIC 65-67), Business and Real Estate (ISIC 70-74). 
Source: Statistics Sweden and author’s calculations. 
 
Table 2 Restructuring in the Swedish business sector 1993–1999 
Share of output (GDP) and hours worked (H) 
 
  1993–1995  1996–1997  1998–1999 
Sector  GDP  H  GDP  H  GDP  H 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
              Goods    28.7    29.4    28.4    29.5    27.4    29.1 
   Manufacturing    18.9    18.3    19.6    19.0    19.3    18.7 
   Electrical and optical eq.    2.3    2.2    2.7    2.5    2.5    2.5 
   Radio, TV, and telecom.    0.9    0.8    1.2    1.0    1.0    1.1 
Services    42.1    38.2    43.0    39.1    43.6    40.0 
   Renting and computer    5.9    6.5    6.8    7.5    8.1    8.3 




Note: The output shares are computed from current SEK values. The sub-sectors are defined as fol-
lows: Goods (ISIC 01-45), Manufacturing (ISIC 10-37), Electrical and optics equipment (ISIC 30-33), 
Radio, TV, and telecommunication (ISIC 32), Services (ISIC 50-95), Renting, computer, and other 
business activities (ISIC 71-74), ICT (ISIC 30, 313, 32, 331, 642, 72). 
Source: Statistics Sweden and author’s calculations. 
 
The Swedish productivity revival has not gone unnoticed. There seems, on first con-
sideration, to be little reason to doubt that the revival in productivity growth during 
the 1990s owes something to the growing high-tech  sector.
5 Indeed, a number of 
economists now emphasize to fast capital accumulation and the latest investment 
boom in high-tech equipment, while others point to other factors such as genuine 
technological change in high-tech industries.
6 There are also economists who empha-
size  the usual procyclical response of productivity when output grows faster than 
trend. Yet others lay emphasis on enhanced methods for measuring price deflators. 
My reading of the empirical literature to date – for the most part based on U.S. data – 
is that the empirical evidence does seem to favor the argument that substantial im-
provements in the production of ICT equipment – typified in particular by faster and 
better semiconductors and rapid decline in quality-adjusted prices on ICT apparatus – 
has contributed right away to economy-wide gains in total factor productivity (TFP). 
However, although users of high-tech equipment contribute directly to ALP through 
high-tech capital deepening, there still appears to be difference of opinion concerning 
the TFP payback from the use of high-tech equipment.
7 
 
Recent attempts to analyze the productivity gains from ICT include, for example, Jor-
genson and Stiroh (2000). Using a standard growth-accounting framework, they found 
that a combination of large technological improvements in high-tech sectors and the 
follow-on investment boom in ICT equipment are the principal driving forces behind 
                                                 
5 Other potential explanations for higher trend productivity growth include, for example, the ongoing 
globalization of the Swedish economy and increased competitive pressure. 
6 Note that parts of the massive investments in high-tech equipment in the late 1990s were due to the 
year-2000 (Y2K) adaptation of computer hardware and software as well as the overhaul of commercial 
and financial systems. 
7 It is, of course, logically possible that the use of high-tech equipment also boosts TFP growth (and 
not only ALP growth) through production spillovers (e.g. learning by doing/investing) and network 




behind the recent U.S. labor productivity resurgence. Oliner and Sichel (2000) con-
firmed this result. Jorgenson (2001) argued that the productivity growth revival is 
above all due to the sharp decline in ICT prices – deep-rooted in the development in 
semiconductor technology.
8 Gordon (2000), in turn, argued that labor productivity 
gains could for the most part be traced to the production of computers (thus, higher 
TFP growth in this production) and cyclical factors.
9 Gordon (1999) stressed that 
there has in fact been a labor productivity hold back in U.S. production of non-
computer durable goods in the second half of the 1990s. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) 
argued that the surge in U.S. productivity originates from over a decade of computer-
generated a dministrative (white-collar) investments that reduce the costs of co-
ordination and information processing within organizations. In addition, Stiroh (2001) 
found that the revival in U.S. labor productivity in the 1990s reflects both the produc-
tion and the use of high-tech capital equipment. Stiroh (2002) found that high-tech 
capital use (ICT capital deepening) is a driving force behind more rapid U.S. labor 
productivity growth, as predicted by conventional economic theories, and that the ef-
fect from high-tech capital use on total factor productivity growth is negligible. This 
finding hence supports the view that the contribution of high-tech capital use on labor 
productivity  operates through traditional capital deepening effects and not through 
higher total factor productivity growth.  
 
In Sweden, we have so far lacked useful data on high-tech capital outlays. One excep-
tion, however, is the information on computer investments that, until 1994, were offi-
cially published every year  in so-called Investment Surveys provided by Statistics 
Sweden. These data have been used earlier by Gunnarsson and Mellander (1999), who 
constructed real computer capital by combining these investment data with standard 
national accounts data. While officially published data on computer hardware and 
software are still in very short supply (they do not exist), this study investigates brand 
                                                 
8 Jorgenson therefore pointed out that one important aim for future research is to find out the product 
cycle of successive generations of modern semiconductors.  
9 Gordon found that although the productivity numbers are impressive for the economy as a whole, 
the U.S. productivity revival appears to have occurred primarily in the production of computer hard-




new data on ICT from 1993 through 1999 (these preliminary data are provided by Sta-
tistics Sweden and are yet to be officially published and available). This additional 
information on high-tech capital has been produced specifically for the present analy-
sis and the Commission on the Review of Economic Statistics. The aim of the article 
is twofold. 
 
First, the principal objective of this paper is to take a closer look at the Swedish pro-
ductivity revival in the second half of the 1990s. Hence, at the most direct level this 
paper tries to explore the productivity effects of a growing high-tech sector in the 
Swedish economy. In particular, I study how productivity growth in different sectors 
has varied from 1994 through 1999 and how these variations relate to high-tech capi-
tal formation. The second objective is to try to explain and draw attention to meas-
urement difficulties that typically show up, and have to be dealt with, in this kind of 
analysis. For example, all the usual data limitations as regards the true utilization and 
quality of capital and labor inputs are to a great extent amplified by technical hitches 
associated with the computer operation time and the true cost of computer power. 
Conceptually, labor should, of course, be divided into hours worked and labor quality 
– and quality should in turn take account of, among other things, sex, age, and educa-
tional composition of the labor force. Similarly, the perfect measure of capital input 
should take into account the operation time (utilization rate) as well as quality differ-
ences among different types of capital. A fast-growing and, in this context, fairly new 
high-tech sector certainly brings with it additional data issues and, as a consequence, 
makes this division much more complicated. 
 
The analysis suggests that a fairly broad labor productivity resurgence took place in 
Sweden during the 1990s (in the manufacturing sector, labor productivity accelerated 
in the second part of the 1990s) – with all principal sectors showing significant labor 
productivity gains in comparison with the 1980s. The analysis suggests sizeable total 
factor productivity growth in high-tech producing sectors and high-tech capital deep-
                                                                                                                                            
cent of the economy involved in manufacturing of durable goods. Gordon also stressed that the effect 




ening in the rest of the economy – these are findings that provide straightforward evi-
dence of information technology’s role in the Swedish productivity resurgence. In ad-
dition, for high-tech producers, high-tech capital deepening has as a rule contributed 
negatively to annual labor productivity growth from 1994 through 1999 – a result 
above all driven by large increases in  hours worked in high-tech industries (this has 
thus resulted in a fall in ICT capital per hours worked). The analysis also documents 
that in the business sector, the contribution from high-tech capital deepening to labor 
productivity growth increased from 1.1 percent in 1994 to 9.1 percent in 1999. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to document statistically the productivity effects in 
the Swedish economy from high-tech capital investments.
10 
 
Another issue is the so-called new doctrine (new economy or new era) which, as usu-
ally stated, rejects the deep-rooted idea that the risk for inflation limits the possibili-
ties for economic growth. The new doctrine explanation for the strong run-up in share 
prices, for example, is faster long-term growth in the economy and the corresponding 
growth of corporate earnings. Although this article does not first and foremost focus 
on this subject, it presents some results that can be of interest when it comes to dis-
criminating between this new doctrine and old thinking. For instance, it appears as if 
the Swedish productivity revival of the 1990s for the most part can be described by 
traditional  neoclassical theory: strong total factor productivity growth in high-tech 
industries and high-tech capital deepening elsewhere seem to be the chief causes of 
the rise in Swedish labor productivity growth. High-tech firms have experienced con-
siderable productivity gains, and other firms have responded to lower prices on high-
tech capital by investing a great deal in high-tech equipment. The present analysis 
does not, however, explain why measured total factor productivity growth has also 
                                                 
10 One earlier Swedish study in which capital is divided into high-tech and non-high-tech capital is, 
as mentioned earlier, Gunnarsson and Mellander (1999), who analyzed whether summation over factor 
inputs into aggregate input measures affects standard TFP calculations. In a related study, Gunnarsson 
et al. (2001) considered both high-tech and human capital when trying to determine the productivity 
effects of high-tech capital. In both these studies, the authors constructed their own data on computer 
capital by combining national accounts three-digit manufacturing data with annual investment surveys 
obtained from  Statistics Sweden. Data on computer investments were, for an unknown reason, e x-
cluded from these surveys in 1995, implying that there is to date no officially published information on 




been high in sectors outside of manufacturing.
11 Can it be the case that the use of 
high-tech capital has improved also TFP growth, or is this just a matter of coincidence 
that has to do with other things (e.g., the business cycle)? This question cannot be an-
swered in this article since the short time series data preclude an adequate analysis of 
whether or not the use of ICT capital has also contributed to TFP growth (and not 
only to ALP growth through capital deepening).
12 
 
Much scope remains to distinguish between cyclical and structural productivity gains 
in the Swedish economy during the 1990s. This is, of course, of importance when it 
comes to getting the macroeconomic picture right – bearing in mind that Sweden es-
caped from a large recession in the middle of the 1990s, this distinction between fluc-
tuation and trend may in fact seem crucial. An adequate distinction between fluctua-
tion and trend must, however, be postponed to future work when additional time se-
ries data are available. 
 
The organization of this article is as follows. Section 2 outlines the analytical frame-
work. This section can be disregarded by anyone familiar with standard growth ac-
counting. Section 3 describes the data, and section 4 presents the central empirical 
findings. Concluding remarks close the analysis in section 5. 
2  Analytical framework 
There is by now a large and growing literature on the macroeconomic implications of 
a growing ICT sector. The general approach in this literature is to begin by computing 
a measure of technological change by means of a traditional growth-accounting 
framework. This framework – which is simple enough to be useful, yet not disas-
                                                 
11 This finding has been reported earlier (on U.S. data) by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), and Oliner 
and Sichel (2000). 
12 These potential productive benefits from an ICT investment may show up on the inside of (inter-
nal to) the economic agent that makes that particular investment (learning by doing), or they may spill 
over to the outside (i.e., an external effect) to other agents in the economy (learning by others doing). 
Note that although some disagreement still remains about this in the literature, the most common find-




trously at odds with reality – is functional, for example, when it comes to finding out 
if the recent productivity upturn is broad in the sense of including the universe of sec-
tors and if sources of productivity growth differ between producers and users of high-
tech equipment. 
 
If stronger labor productivity growth is broad, then, of course, this productivity re-
vival is more likely to be long lasting than would otherwise have been the case. In-
deed, if faster productivity growth were concentrated to a few sectors, the productivity 
revival would be at risk to a slowdown in these sectors. In addition, if a growing ICT 
sector is the prime driving force behind the productivity revival, one would probably 
expect to find strong TFP (and hence ALP) growth in ICT producing sectors and ICT 
capital deepening in other sectors. Improvement in the production of computers 
would, for example, show up both in a growing performance-price ratio and faster 
growth in TFP (ALP). Users of high-tech equipment, in turn, take action in response 
to falling relative prices on high-tech equipment by investing in ICT – and this also 
boosts ALP growth. 
2.1  Comparing output and input growth 
Consider a general production function  ) , , ( V L K F Y =  for a single firm, where Y is 
value-added output (that is, gross output net of intermediate inputs).
13 Capital and la-
bor inputs are denoted by K and L, respectively. V is an index of the level of technol-
ogy. Note that beneficial spillover effects that raise overall productivity in the econ-
omy could, of course, be explicitly modeled in this context – ICT capital equipment 
can, for example, give rise to production spillovers and a number of network external-
ities. The former effect is the usual learning-by-doing (investing) effects associated 
with capital that tend to boost overall productivity in the economy when knowledge is 
                                                 
13 I take no account in this article of the potential measurement difficulties associated with the improper 
use of value-added data as an output measure, even though I do not doubt that value-added may some-
times fail to account correctly for the productive contribution of intermediate inputs. True value-added 
output should optimally be constructed by subtracting the productive contribution of intermediate in-
puts (that is, energy, materials, and business services) from gross output. However, as Basu and Fernald 
(1995) pointed out, when the contribution of intermediate inputs is measured by factor payments, real 




non-rival and protection of proprietary information is incomplete. The latter is a new 
effect originating from firms investing in comparable communication equipment. 
 
Now, let the production function F be homogenous of degree g  in capital and labor, 
and of degree one in V.
 Logarithmic differentiating of F yields 
  , ln ) ln ln ( ln ln V d K d L d
Y
L F
K d Y d





￿ + =g   (2.1) 
where Y d ln ,  K d ln ,  L d ln , and  V d ln  are the growth rates of Y, K, L, and V.  L F  is 
the marginal product of labor. I have used the homogeneity conditions 
g = + Y L F K F L K / ) (  and  1 / = Y V F V  in the derivation of (2.1). This model thus com-
pares movements in output with movements in inputs and, accordingly, relates to the 
growth accounting literature originating from Solow (1957). The growth rate of tech-
nology ( V d ln ) is the Solow residual. 
 
Equation (2.1) can be further simplified by making the assumptions that firms have 
some monopoly power in output markets (but not in the market for factor inputs), and 
that the behavior of firms can be approximated by a sequence of static problems. A 
simple expression for the ratio  Y L FL /  can be found by assuming that a representative 
firm (now indexed by i) faces the demand function  ) / ( ) / ( P M P P Y i i
h - = . The price 
level of firm i’s output is denoted by  i P, P is the general price level, M is the mone-
tary base, and h is the elasticity of demand. 
 
Firms are assumed to maximize the profit function  i i i i i rK wL Y P - - = p  with respect 
to labor and capital inputs in every time period. The wage rate w and the capital cost r 




















where  ) 1 /( - = h h m  is the markup factor.
14 Now, let  v a  denote labor’s share in total 
value-added output, that is  i i i v Y P wL / = a , and use the first relation in (2.2) to obtain 
i i L v Y L F / = ma .
15 By combining the two first-order conditions with the homogeneity 
condition that  g = + Y L F K F L K / ) ( , the product  v ma  can, in turn, be rewritten in 
terms of the (internal) returns-to-scale parameter  g  and labor’s share in total factor 
costs  c a  










  (2.3) 
where  ) /( i i i c rK wL wL + ” a . Substitution of  c ga  for  Y L FL /  in (2.1) yields the equa-
tion that is used in this study 
  , ln ln ln it it it it V d X d Y d + =g   (2.4) 
where  it dX  is a weighted index of input growth 
  it cit it cit it K d L d X d ln ) 1 ( ln ln a a - + ” .  (2.5) 
The variables and parameters are now written with firm and time subscripts to empha-
size that they can change across firms as well as over time. 
 
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) can easily be re-formulated in terms of average labor pro-
ductivity growth by assuming constant returns to scale and subtracting the growth rate 
of worked hours from both sides. After doing this, it is clear that average labor pro-
ductivity growth can be divided into total factor productivity growth and the contribu-
tion from so-called capital deepening 
 
                                                 
14 Note that no assumption of constancy of the markup factor is required. 
15 When output and input markets are competitive, the necessary conditions for producer equilibrium 
are that the share of every input in the value of output equals the output elasticity with respect to that 




  . ln ln ln ln ln it it it it it V d x d L d Y d y d + = - =   (2.6) 
Here, the growth of weighted inputs per worked hour is defined as 
  , ln ) 1 ( ln ln ln it cit it it it k d L d X d x d a - ” - =   (2.7) 
and 
  . ln ln ln it it it L d K d k d - =   (2.8) 
 
Equation (2.6) hence splits labor productivity growth into capital deepening in the 
sense of capital per hours worked (the more capital per hours worked, the higher is 
labor productivity) and total factor productivity growth (higher TFP means higher 
ALP). This completes the description of the model. While simple, it captures the es-
sence of a number of different scenarios.
16 
 
Note that if the underlying assumptions in this model fail to hold, the Solow residual 
will include other things than just true technological change – for example, various 
distortions due to imperfect competition and spillover effects in production (see, for 
example, Lindström (2000)), omitted intermediate input variables due to the improper 
use of value-added data (see Basu and Fernald (1995)), and cyclical effects (Lind-
ström (2000)).
17 Note also that even though various measurement difficulties may af-
fect the Solow residual, it remains a useful indicator of pure technological change and 
welfare. 
 
Broadly defined capital – which may include, for example, physical as well as human 
capital (human capital depends on  education, on-the-job training, and research and 
                                                                                                                                            
equal to the total cost of the production factors, and hence the share of labor in output then equals the 
share of labor in total factor costs. 
16 Note, however, that although this type of neoclassical analysis can illustrate what has happened in 
the economy as regards productivity growth it cannot explain why it happened. 
17 Note also that more thorough representations of the production process may include, for example, 
dynamic cost function models in which variable and quasi-fixed inputs are explicitly taken into account 




development) – often plays an important role in growth-accounting exercises. In the 
next section, tangible capital is split into three parts. 
2.2  High-tech capital 
In the analysis below, the real stock of capital is divided into three subgroups: (i) 
buildings (subscript  B), (ii) machinery and equipment exclusive of ICT equipment 
(subscript  M ), and (iii) ICT equipment (subscript  ICT ). ICT equipment is defined to 
include computer hardware and software as well as telecommunications equipment. 
Dividing total capital into these three parts yields a detailed analogue to equation (2.7) 
 
  , ln ln ln ln ICTi ICTi Mi Mi Bi Bi i k d k d k d x d b b b + + ”   (2.9) 
where the beta coefficients represent each factor’s share in total cost 
  . , , , ) 1 ( ICT M B j S ji it ji = - = a b   (2.10) 
Time subscripts have been suppressed in equation (2.9). In the present study,  Bi S , 
Mi S , and  ITCi S  are computed as the current value shares of each of the three types of 
capital in total capital – they hence sum to one (for more information, see section 3). 
Equations (2.6) and (2.9) hence capture the essence of the  growth-accounting ap-
proach. 
3  The data 
The current data set represents a sub-sample of the officially published Swedish n a-
tional accounts data from 1993 through 1999, provided by Statistics Sweden, supple-
mented by new time-series records on annual investments in high-tech equipment. 
The additional information on high-tech capital has been produced specifically for the 
present analysis and the 2002 Commission on the Review of Economic Statistics. The 




attention to the usual problems as regards the measurement of effective factor inputs 
and how these problems are affected by a fast-growing high-tech sector. 
 
The perpetual inventory method is used to compute the stock of each of the three as-
sets buildings (subscript  B), machinery and equipment exclusive of high-tech capital 
(M ), and high-tech capital ( ICT ): 
  , , , , ) 1 ( 1 1 ICT M B j I K K jt jt
j
jt = + - = - - d   (3.1) 
where 
j d  is the economic rate of annual depreciation and  1 - jt I  is the gross investment 
in asset  j  in period  1 - t . 
 
While constructing these data, special care was taken to account for differences in the 
depreciation rates and price deflators for computer hardware and software (see also 
section 4.3).  
3.1  The share of capital and labor 
In order to derive an indicator of firm-level input activity,  it dx , capital and labor are, 
according to (2.9), weighted by their shares in total factor costs. Total labor compen-
sation (that is, total wage expenses, social security contributions, and mandatory in-
surance fees) is used here for the labor cost. Labor is measured by the number of 
hours worked per year. 
 
One way to assess the user cost of capital is to follow Hall and Jorgenson (1967) – 
firm i’s user cost of asset  j  can then be computed according to
18 
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The economic rate of annual depreciation 
j d  typically lies in the interval 0.10-0.15, 
and the real rate of return required on capital is normally approximated by subtracting 
the CPI inflation rate from the required nominal and tax-adjusted rate of return on 
capital (that is, 
j p r - ). The investment tax credit 
j
i ITC , in turn, measures the pro-
portion of the original investment cost that is subsidized by the government. The pre-
sent value of depreciation allowances for an investment is captured by 
j G . The re-
quired payment for the jth asset then equals 
j jK r , where 
j K  is the current value of 
the stock of this particular asset. The total cost of employing capital in production, 
broadly measured as the sum of all types of capital, then equals the sum of the re-
quired payment for each of the assets. The share of capital (broadly measured) can 
then be obtained by dividing the total cost of capital by the sum of total capital and 
labor costs. 
 
Another route is to approximate the total cost of employing broadly measured capital 
by the operation surplus. This surplus, which is sometimes directly available in the 
data at hand, is defined as the value of output net of all labor costs. Asset j’s share in 
total costs can then be computed as  






j = - =
￿
a b   (3.3) 
where a  is labor’s share in total costs, defined as total labor costs divided by the sum 
of total labor costs and the operation surplus, and  j K  is the current stock value of as-
set j. Table 3 shows the current value shares of each of the three types of capital input 
in total capital. According to the table, in the business sector the share of current value 
ICT equipment increased from 3.2 percent  in  1993 to 5.2 percent  in 1999. In the 
goods sector this share increased from 4.0 percent to 5.9 percent, and in the service 
sector it increased from 2.9 to 5.0 percent. The ICT capital share increased from 7.4 in 
1993 to 10.1 percent in 1999 in the manufacturing sector, and, interestingly, it de-
creased from 32.9 to 31.3 percent among ICT-producers. Here, this sector is defined 




(iii) radio, television and communication equipment, (iv) medical, surgical and ortho-
pedic i nstruments, (v) telecommunications equipment measured by radio transmit, 
operation of cable-television, and the use of electric power, and (vi) data processing 
and computer (hardware and software) consulting. In the current analysis, equation 
(3.3) is used for measuring each asset’s share in total costs. 
 
Table 3 Capital stock shares 
 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                Business sector               
  B  79,7  80,3  80,2  79,4  78,5  77,7  76,6 
  M  17,1  16,3  16,2  16,6  17,1  17,6  18,1 
  ICT  3,2  3,4  3,7  4,0  4,3  4,7  5,2 
                  Goods               
  B  57,5  58,0  57,6  56,7  55,6  54,7  53,8 
  M  38,5  37,7  37,8  38,3  39,2  39,9  40,3 
  ICT  4,0  4,3  4,6  4,9  5,2  5,4  5,9 
                  Manufacturing               
  B  40,0  40,1  39,4  38,3  37,2  36,4  35,6 
  M  52,6  52,1  52,2  52,8  53,7  54,2  54,3 
  ICT  7,4  7,9  8,4  8,9  9,1  9,4  10,1 
                  Services               
  B  88,4  88,9  88,9  88,3  87,7  87,1  86,1 
  M  8,7  8,1  7,8  8,0  8,3  8,5  9,0 
  ICT  2,9  3,0  3,3  3,7  4,0  4,4  5,0 
                  ICT-producers               
  B  53,7  54,2  53,6  52,2  51,0  50,0  48,2 
  M  13,5  15,3  16,6  17,9  18,8  19,6  20,5 
  ICT  32,9  30,6  29,8  29,9  30,2  30,4  31,3 
                Note: The shares are computed from real SEK values. B stands for buildings, M for machinery  
and equipment exclusive of ICT, and ICT for ICT equipment.  
Source: Statistics Sweden and author’s calculations. 
 
Note that due to various measurement difficulties, estimates of the cost of capital are 
at best good approximations of the true cost of capital. It is normally safer to underes-
timate this cost than the opposite since capital is in general less cyclical than labor. 








A closer look at data (not reported here) reveals that capital’s share  is sometimes 
pretty high (about 0.5 in 1999 for the business sector and a few percentage points 
smaller in earlier years). Perhaps a more plausible range for capital’s share in total 
factor costs  is  about  30-40 percent (see, for example, Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(1998)). I have experimented with an unvarying 30 percent capital share across all 
sectors without qualitatively affecting the results. 
3.2  Measurement difficulties 
Apart from potential stochastic measurement errors and the possible omitted-variable 
bias caused by simple data aggregation, one limitation of the available data is that dif-
ferences in the quality of the production factors are not accounted for. In particular, 
the measure of labor input does not consider the distribution of competence levels 
among the employees. It is also rather likely that quality differences among different 
types of capital inputs are not satisfactorily considered even though capital inputs are 
split into three parts.
20 In Basu and Fernald (1995), however, similar results were ob-
tained when using quality-adjusted workforce and capital data or non-adjusted data, 
suggesting that the induced error of not taking into account input qualities might not 
be crucial. 
 
Another limitation is the lack of information on the factor utilization rates. Labor in-
put is computed as the volume of labor in the sense of  hours worked. Hence, this 
measure only matches effective labor input to the extent that it accounts for variations 
                                                 
19 Yet another difficulty when it comes to computing the factor shares is that Swedish firms have oc-
casionally been allowed to reduce their current tax payments. For exa mple, additional tax rules have 
been introduced from 1980 through 1993 to subsidize firms mainly in the service sector by allowing 
rescheduling of tax payments equivalent to up to 20 percent of total wage costs. 
20 Note that data availability often have a strong bearing on the actual variable definitions in empiri-
cal studies of this kind. A very broad measure of capital may, for example, include capital outlays on 
tangible (physical) assets as well as human capital in the sense of education attainment, on-the-job 




over the business cycle in labor effort. This is, of course, hardly ever the case. Simi-
larly, the measure of capital inputs does not take into account variations in utilization 
rates. It is, of course, possible that a fast-growing high-tech sector brings with it addi-
tional data problems.
21 The theoretical ideal should be input measures adjusted for 
quality differences as well as utilization rates.
22 A final limitation is that the data do 
not include information on intermediate inputs, such as energy, materials, and busi-
ness services. This lack of information precludes a gross output formulation of equa-
tion (2.6). 
 
Yet another data issue is the possibility that it may take some time for capital inputs to 
generate output. To allow for such delay, equation (2.6) can be modified somewhat to 
include lagged input variables. 
4  Empirical analysis 
The questions addressed in this article have some important implications for the econ-
omy as a whole. Consider for example the question  of  whether productivity gains 
have occurred in the universe of industries or just in a few of them. If productivity in-
creases are general, the productivity revival is probably more robust than would oth-
erwise have been the case. In addition, if the productivity increase is general, the re-
sulting income and economic gains are distributed more equally over industries. The 
distribution of income – either directed evenly to all industries or just to a few of them 
– directly affects the well being of the employees. 
                                                 
21 For discussions of other problems as regards the measurement of the contribution of computers at 
the macroeconomic level, see Baily and Gordon (1998), and Siegel (1997). 
22 Many studies have identified the problems associated with measuring of factor inputs. Examples 
are Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) who considered difficulties in the measurement of labor input when 
analyzing procyclical labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing, and Griliches (1994) who argued that 
measurement difficulties may be a major cause of the slow progress in our understanding of productiv-
ity growth. Moreover, due to difficulties in measuring input utilization rates, Benhabib and Jovanovic 




4.1  Results from growth-accounting 
The work reported in this section focuses on the benchmark growth-accounting rela-
tionship as described by equations (2.6) and (2.9). These expressions split labor pro-
ductivity growth into capital deepening, in the sense of capital per hours worked, and 
total factor productivity growth. This exercise raises a few questions that, in one way 
or another, have been considered earlier. One concerns the nature of the data and the 
construction of the relevant variables. In particular, the short time series data imply 
that it is difficult to distinguish between cycle and trend productivity growth. Another 
shortcoming is that input quality and utilization rates are not accounted for. Further-
more, the benchmark equations implicitly assume constant returns to scale, which 
may or may not hold. However, it may certainly be a reasonable approximation, espe-
cially over longer time periods. The equations also allow for parameters varying over 
time and across sectors. In the analysis presented below, all cost shares are computed 
according to equation (3.3) – hence, these shares vary over time and between sectors. 
 
Another issue is, as mentioned in the introduction, the question  of  whether or not 
there appears to be an empirical link between ICT use (rather than production) and 
gains in total factor productivity. The answer to this question determines if ICT-
related capital deepening should be characterized as productive or unproductive. In-
deed, during the 1990s, firms invested heavily in ICT in the hope of improving profits 
and productivity. Potential gains from ICT could be realized through a number of 
channels, such as productive spillovers and network effects due to faster information 
flows within and between firms. If investments in high-tech equipment really result in 
total productivity gains, one would expect to see a link between high-tech investment 
and gains in total factor productivity across industries. Such a link would allow indi-
vidual industries, and hence the economy as a whole, to produce more output and thus 
implies a true economic benefit from the high-tech revolution.  Alas, the present 






It is  worth mentioning here that one possibility is that  high-tech equipment may 
merely be used to reallocate the market share between the competing firms – for ex-
ample when a traditional store loses business to an on-line business – or it may in-
crease on-the-job consumption – for example, when workers play video games. Size-
able training and support costs that go along with high-tech capital outlays may also 
limit the productivity gains. If all of these counteracting effects are large enough, one 
might not see a positive link between high-tech investments and total factor produc-
tivity gains. 
 
Table 4 Accounting for productivity growth in Sweden 1994–1999 
Business (ISIC 01-95) 
 
  1994–99  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                (1) Growth in output    4.18    4.39    5.99    1.83    3.55    4.36    4.94 
(2) Growth in hours worked    1.67    2.39    3.22    0.14   –0.52    1.60    3.17 
(3) Growth in ALP    2.51    1.99    2.77    1.68    4.07    2.76    1.77 
(4)    Capital deepening    –0.71   –1.54   –1.84    0.12    0.54   –0.52   –1.03 
(5)       Buildings    –0.78   –0.94   –1.51   –0.27    0.05   –0.75   –1.26 
(6)       Machinery excl. ICT    –0.04   –0.62   –0.39    0.22    0.36    0.12    0.07 
(7)       ICT    0.11    0.02    0.07    0.16    0.13    0.11    0.16 
(8)    TFP growth    3.22    3.53    4.60    1.56    3.54    3.28    2.80 
(9) ICT share in ALP growth    5.72    1.11    2.64    9.64    3.27    3.89    9.13 
Note: In 1999 the business sector accounted for 70.8 (69.3) percent of total current value GDP (hours 
worked) in the Swedish economy. The ICT share in ALP growth is computed as the ICT capital deep-
ening divided by the growth of ALP. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
Table 4 presents the growth-accounting results for the period 1994-1999. The first two 
lines show the growth in output and the growth in hours worked. The third line is the 
growth rate of output per hour worked (i.e., the labor productivity growth), which can 
be calculated in the table by subtracting the growth rate of labor hours in the second 
line from the growth rate of output in the first line. Labor productivity growth, in turn, 




tal per hour multiplied by capital’s share in total factor costs, and total factor produc-
tivity growth (line 8). Hence, the growth rate of output per hour minus a fraction of 
the growth rate of capital per hour equals total factor productivity growth. Capital 
deepening is in turn split into buildings-related deepening (line 5), machinery-related 
deepening exclusive of ICT (line 6), and ICT-related deepening (line 7). Thus, the 
sum of line (5), (6), and (7) equals line (4). The second to last line (line 8) is total fac-
tor productivity, which is productivity growth based on a weighted average of several 
inputs – in this case labor and capital with weights based on the share of each input in 
total factor costs. The last line (line 9) shows the ICT share in labor productivity 
growth, computed as the ICT capital deepening in line (7) divided by the growth of 
labor productivity in line (3). 
 
The main conclusions from table 4 are as follows. First, annual TFP growth was espe-
cially strong in 1994 and 1995 (3.5 and 4.6 percent, respectively), which probably has 
to do in part with cyclical forces – remember that Sweden escaped from a large reces-
sion in the middle of the 1990s. Second, the contribution from aggregate capital deep-
ening to labor productivity growth is negative in 1994, 1995, 1998, and 1999. Line 5 
shows that buildings-related capital deepening drives this result. A negative contribu-
tion to productivity growth from aggregate capital deepening is a rather unusual em-
pirical finding, especially over longer periods of time. One possible reason for why 
capital per hours worked declined in 1994-1995 is that it represents a surge in work-
ing hours in the aftermath of the 1991-93 recession years (that is, this is a cyclical ef-
fect).
23 Other potential explanations include various difficulties concerning, in particu-
lar, the measurement of capital inputs. For example, capital per hours worked may fall 
as a result of the implicit assumptions that are made in the construction of the data as 
regards the capital depreciation rate and the price of capital. Both a higher assumed 
computer hardware and software depreciation rate and an underestimation of the true 
quality-adjusted price decline of computer hardware and software will lead to an un-
                                                 
23 The contribution from machinery exclusive of ICT was negative in 1994 and 1995, which reflects 
large increases in hours worked after the end of the recession. Then, as the business cycle returned to 
normal, investments in machinery exclusive of ICT started to increase more than hours, leaving a posi-




derestimation of the growth rate of computer capital, which, in turn, will drive down 
the capital-labor ratio. Third, the productivity contribution from high-tech equipment 
has accelerated during the period – from 0.02 percentage points in 1994 to 0.16 per-
centage points in 1999 (see line 7). These numbers imply that the contribution from 
high-tech capital deepening to labor productivity growth has increased from 1.1 per-
cent in 1994 to 9.1 percent in 1999 (see line 9) – hence the importance of high-tech 
equipment for aggregate productivity growth has increased over the period. The labor 
productivity growth in the business sector thus appears to be driven by  rising high-
tech-related capital deepening as well as total factor productivity growth. 
 
Tables 5-8 repeat this exercise for the goods sector, services sector, manufacturing 
sector, and ICT sector, respectively. Upon first examination of these tables there are 
several main findings. In particular, the productivity contribution from aggregate capi-
tal deepening is typically negative (the only exception is the manufacturing sector). 
Furthermore, the productive contribution from the use of high-tech equipment is in 
general positive and has accelerated over the period. The exception here – disregard 
for the moment the services sector in 1999 – is, interestingly, the high-tech sector in 
itself (here the high-tech share in labor productivity growth averages –5.8 percent). 
This probably has to do with massive increases in hours worked in this sector.
24 An-
other possibility is, as already mentioned, that high-tech capital may be underesti-
mated. It is also interesting to note that TFP growth has been exceptionally high in the 
high-tech sector throughout the time period, an annual average of 13.1 percent as 
compared with 5.3 percent in total manufacturing (see tables 7 and 8).
25 The growth in 
labor productivity in the high-tech sector, in turn, averaged slightly more than 11 per-
cent per year over the period – reflecting an increase in output growth of almost 19 
percent per year and an increase in hours worked of slightly more than 7.5 percent. 
However, the size of this sector is small, implying that there is only a limited impact 
from labor productivity growth in this sector on economy-wide productivity growth. 
                                                 
24 Note that in the ICT sector the productivity contribution from machinery exclusive of ICT is none-
theless typically positive (the annual average is 0.2 percentage points) despite large increases in hours 
in this sector. This suggests massive investments in machinery exclusive of ICT during the period. 





Table 5 Accounting for productivity growth in Sweden 1994–1999 
Goods (ISIC 01-45) 
 
  1994–99  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                (1) Growth in output    5.09    8.70    7.30    0.65    3.36    5.07    5.46 
(2) Growth in hours worked    0.87    0.89    5.00   –1.33   –1.23    0.89    0.98 
(3) Growth in ALP    4.22    7.81    2.30    1.98    4.59    4.18    4.47 
(4)    Capital deepening    –0.03   –1.16   –2.29    1.17    1.33    0.41    0.36 
(5)       Buildings    –0.26   –0.43   –1.49    0.31    0.32   –0.14   –0.13 
(6)       Machinery excl. ICT    0.11   –0.78   –0.83    0.66    0.87    0.44    0.31 
(7)       ICT    0.12    0.05    0.03    0.19    0.14    0.11    0.18 
(8)    TFP growth    4.25    8.97    4.60    0.81    3.26    3.77    4.11 
(9) ICT share in ALP growth    3.58    0.67    1.36    9.85    2.96    2.62    3.99 
Note: In 1999 the goods sector accounted for 27.0 (28.8) percent of total current value GDP (hours 
worked) in the Swedish economy. Its share of value-added (hours worked) in the business sector was 
38.1 (41.6) percent. The ICT share in ALP growth is computed as the ICT capital deepening divided by 
the growth of ALP. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
Table 6 Accounting for productivity growth in Sweden 1994–1999 
Services (ISIC 50-95) 
 
  1994–99  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                (1) Growth in output    3.57    1.47    5.08    2.65    3.68    3.90    4.61 
(2) Growth in hours worked    2.27    3.54    1.86    1.28    0.01    2.14    4.76 
(3) Growth in ALP    1.30   –2.07    3.22    1.37    3.67    1.76   –0.15 
(4)    Capital deepening    –1.20   –2.03   –1.31   –0.68    0.02   –1.12   –2.08 
(5)       Buildings    –1.22   –1.55   –1.13   –0.90   –0.25   –1.23   –2.28 
(6)       Machinery excl. ICT    –0.08   –0.49   –0.28    0.08    0.14    0.00    0.05 
(7)       ICT    0.11    0.00    0.10    0.14    0.13    0.11    0.15 
(8)    TFP growth    2.50   –0.04    4.54    2.05    3.65    2.88    1.93 
(9) ICT share in ALP growth   –12.50   –0.15    3.10   10.52    3.61    6.03   –98.1 
Note: In 1999 the service sector accounted for 43.9 (40.5) percent of total current value GDP (hours 




61.9 (58.4) percent. The ICT share in ALP growth is computed as the ICT capital deepening divided by 
the growth of ALP. Note also that the annual average ICT share in ALP growth over the period 1994-
99 is highly affected by the negative ALP growth in 1999; the median value of the ICT share 1994-99 
is 3.36 percent, and the ICT share 1994-98 is 4.62 percent. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
Table 7 Accounting for productivity growth in Sweden 1994–1999 
Manufacturing (ISIC 15-37) 
 
  1994–99  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                (1) Growth in output    7.30   13.98    9.18    2.05    5.15    6.71    6.72 
(2) Growth in hours worked    1.74    3.24    7.13   –0.01   –0.97    1.42   –0.33 
(3) Growth in ALP    5.55   10.75    2.06    2.06    6.12    5.29    7.05 
(4)    Capital deepening    0.26   –1.95   –2.56    1.61    2.16    0.87    1.41 
(5)       Buildings    –0.18   –0.72   –1.23    0.22    0.38    0.04    0.24 
(6)       Machinery excl. ICT    0.25   –1.26   –1.33    1.07    1.54    0.66    0.82 
(7)       ICT    0.19    0.03    0.00    0.32    0.24    0.18    0.36 
(8)    TFP growth    5.30   12.69    4.62    0.45    3.96    4.42    5.64 
(9) ICT share in ALP growth    4.73    0.29    0.11   15.65    3.94    3.33    5.04 
Note: In 1999 the manufacturing sector accounted for 19.1 (18.4) percent of total current value GDP 
(hours worked) in the Swedish economy. Its share of value-added (hours worked) in the business sector 
was 27.0 (26.6) percent. The ICT share in ALP growth is computed as the ICT capital deepening di-
vided by the growth of ALP. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
Table 8 Accounting for productivity growth in Sweden 1994–1999 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (ISIC 30, 313, 32, 331, 642, 72) 
 
  1994–99  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                (1) Growth in output    18.93   22.08   17.96   18.14   16.79   16.08   22.50 
(2) Growth in hours worked    7.55    4.61   11.42    7.07    5.02    7.23    9.98 
(3) Growth in ALP    11.37   17.47    6.54   11.07   11.77    8.85   12.52 
(4)    Capital deepening    –1.79   –1.43   –4.04   –0.74   –0.59   –1.69   –2.25 
(5)       Buildings    –1.41   –0.65   –2.60   –1.06   –0.84   –1.41   –1.93 




  1994–99  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
(7)       ICT    –0.56   –1.34   –1.34   –0.15   –0.01   –0.29   –0.23 
(8)    TFP growth    13.16   18.90   10.58   11.81   12.36   10.55   14.77 
(9) ICT share in ALP growth    –5.79   –7.69   –20.5   –1.33   –0.12   –3.27   –1.80 
Source: In 1999 the ICT sector accounted for 5.6 (4.1) percent of total current value GDP (hours 
worked) in the Swedish economy. Its share of value-added (hours worked) in the business sector was 
8.0 (5.9) percent. The ICT share in ALP growth is computed as the ICT capital deepening divided by 
the growth of ALP. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and the author’s calculations. 
 
Hence, to sum up, the key empirical finding in this section is that the Swedish produc-
tivity revival of the 1990s – as measured by the growth of labor productivity – is in 
part a result of a growing high-tech sector: I find sizeable total factor productivity 
growth in high-tech producing sectors and capital deepening associated with high-tech 
equipment elsewhere. The analysis moreover indicates a rising importance of high-
tech equipment as a normal input in the production process, and the fact that the con-
tribution of other capital goods has declined may in fact indicate a switch from tradi-
tional capital into high-tech capital. The potential for this substitution is likely to vary 
between the sectors – conceivably the ability to switch is largest for services, while in 
the manufacturing sector high-tech capital is typically complementary to traditional 
capital inputs. 
 
Much scope remains, however, to distinguish between cyclical and structural produc-
tivity gains. Bearing in mind that Sweden escaped from a large recession in the mid-
dle of the 1990s, this distinction between fluctuation and trend seems crucial. Due to 
data limitations, however, I leave this to future work. Another issue is causality; note 
that even though the exercise above suggests that high-tech capital investments im-
prove productivity growth, it could also be the other way around – strong productivity 
growth would then lead to investments in high-tech capital. Data limitations preclude 
a closer analysis of this as well.
26 
                                                 
26 In order to determine the causality between high-tech investments and productivity, time-series 




4.2  The information age 
In the 1990s, a number of business economists launched what came to be known as 
the new paradigm (new era) economics. As regularly stated, this new doctrine aban-
doned the old idea that the threat of inflation would limit the possibilities for sustained 
economic growth. According to this view, rapid productivity growth together with 
increased competition and global integration would imply that even considerable 
growth rates would not cause any inflationary pressures. This opinion is often casually 
referred to as something that has to do with the new economy. The present analysis 
obviously relates to the above in that it investigates the productivity contribution from 
high-tech capital. It does not, however, go into any details as regards the variety of 
new era definitions that circulate nor does it in any way speculate about the future 
prospects of the new era and its likely effects in general on society as a whole. This 
lies outside the scope of the analysis. In contrast, the growth-accounting framework in 
the present analysis implicitly assumes traditional economic forces – and as long as 
the output from this exercise is sensible there is no need for tentative conjectures. Yet, 
taken at face value, although the results from the growth accounting exercise, saying 
both that total factor productivity growth has been very large in the high-tech produc-
ing sector and that high-tech capital deepening has been important elsewhere, is quali-
tatively in line with what most people would probably expect, one could perhaps raise 
objections against the magnitudes of these effects. 
4.3  Future work 
While allowing for preliminary data on high-tech capital and the subsequent feedback 
from experienced economists, the Commission on the Review of Economic Statistics 
makes a promising attempt to improve parts of the official statistics in Sweden. The 
present analysis exemplifies what can be accomplished using rather simple means and 
identifies some data issues that deserve additional attention. For example, the negative 
productivity contribution from aggregate capital deepening raises a few questions 
concerning the construction of the capital data: if the high-tech capital depreciation 




high-tech capital will be underestimated. This would hence drive down the ratio of 
high-tech capital and worked hours, leading to a smaller contribution to labor produc-
tivity growth from high-tech capital deepening. 
 
Another related issue is the size of the residual in the growth accounting exercise (this 
part is labeled total factor productivity growth). An underestimation of the growth of 
factor inputs inevitable leads to an overestimation of the residual. 
5  Conclusions 
To summarize, the key empirical finding of this study is that Swedish labor productiv-
ity growth in the 1990s has increased in part as a result of massive investments in 
high-tech capital. The underlying forces seem to be pure technological improvements 
in the production of high-tech assets that have lowered the relative price and induced 
massive high-tech capital outlays. These high-tech investments have contributed im-
mediately to labor productivity gains through high-tech-related capital deepening. 
More high-tech capital can work for a while, but sooner or later computer hardware 
and software as well as telecommunications equipment will run into diminishing re-
turns (as will any production factor) – there are hence real limitations to this devel-
opment. The finding of large total factor productivity growth in high-tech producing 
sectors and capital deepening associated with high-tech capital elsewhere reflects tra-
ditional economic forces such as pure technological change and factor input substitu-
tion. 
 
Whether or not high-tech capital use is productive in the sense of improving also total 
factor productivity growth is still an open question – this analysis does not shed any 
light on this issue due to data limitations (too short time series data). The channels 
through which high-tech equipment logically can boost total factor productivity are 
many – for example, the usual productive spillovers implying that investors can bene-




from enhanced information exchange among actors with comparable communication 
equipment. 
 
Many caveats remain, however. One is the procyclical behavior of productivity. Since 
productivity tends to move with overall economic activity the Swedish productivity 
resurgence may in fact, as discussed  in this article, merely reflect output growing 
faster than trend growth. The current analysis does not try to guess how much of the 
productivity surge of the 1990s reflects improvements in the underlying trend and 
how much is attributable to cyclical forces. Another caveat has to do with causality – 
whether or not high-tech equipment spurs productivity, or whether or not it is in fact 
just the other way around, is not analyzed in any detail. The working hypothesis thus 
is that the growth-accounting framework can be taken literally. Another issue con-
cerns the methods for measuring the true cost of computer power and the underlying 
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